Motives, as Jesus, Kant, Nietzsche, (in alphabetical and temporal order) and others have pointed out, are a basis for a determination of morality. A good motive is a prerequisite to conduct that must be objectively defined and approved of without qualification. If a good motive is present when an act, through some unforeseen factor, leads to harmful effects then individuals or a group composed thereof tends to disprove less severely. In light of cognitive biases such as the curse of knowledge and/or anchoring it is not uncommon for people to say, "Anyway, they meant well." But when people ask, "What is best in this situation?" their intentions are generally well regarded, as they are those who are trying to find the proper execution in order to carry out the task or duty at hand.
Just as there are, or might be, many motives for desiring something, there may be many means of achieving it. Expectations demand people to use the best means of and for purposeful achievement. The student who cheats to pass examinations is condemned. Although, on rare occasions, all may approve an act when the means that are used (that under other conditions) would be condemned. Take the classic example of the theater manager who finds their theater on fire backstage while a performance is in progress. While desiring to protect the audience, a similar occasion is immediately recalled in the past when the audience became panicky and stampeded, resulting in injury and loss of life. The manager goes before the audience, therefore, gives a false reason for ceasing the production and the theater is emptied without injury or loss of life. To imply that any means may be used, provided it can be shown that the end is good is to state a dangerous principle; but their are those rare occasions in which the goodness of the end outweighs certain evil means that otherwise seem unavoidable. Positive consequences can ordinarily be achieved only by the use of good means. Once chosen, the means become part of the general effect of an act.
Who would not expect the general consequences of an act called right to be correct and good? Ordinarily when people ask, "What is best?" they are focused not only on outcomes and consequences of the possible action, but also on what could be considered as optimal. Conduct is right if it proceeds from an honorable motive, through the use of the best available means, to consequences that have been accepted by all stakeholders. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the action will be condemned, or the tenuous approval will only be with reservations and potential future obligations. Rarely, and hopefully never, do individuals approve an action when the results are obviously evil. In the case of the surgeon operating with skill on a patient who dies in spite of all efforts to save them, we approve of the action because the motive was good and because, in the light of the knowledge available at the time, it was thought that this endeavor was the one most likely to result in a positive consequence.
With this objective basis for morality ethical judgments are asserted as something that may be either true or false, dependent on the available evidence. Whether or not an act is right or wrong is a fact to be discovered. This means that distinctions between right and wrong are not mere matters of opinion, culture, society, custom, or emotion. In this light some acts are to be condemned and some are to be held in esteem, regardless of what members of the community think about them. Whether an act has good or evil results can usually be ascertained by an appeal to human experience and/or all objective empirical evidence at hand.
Ideally, this interpretation recognizes the dynamic, functional, and thus inherent experimental nature of morality. Moral judgments grow out of life and are affected by dynamic ever changing conditions. While all may have differing views of what is right and wrong, just as in having differing conceptions of what is true and false, we may hope to be able to resolve the differences with additional insight. This interpretation places a premium on content, clarity, and within the growing knowledge in the information age. The more that is known about each other, about our own selves, our interpretations of experience, about social relations, and about the encompassing universe, the greater the likely hood that ethical judgement are accurate, precise, and consistent despite the dynamic changing conditions. In such light knowledge and research in all fields take on new significance.
This view recognizes the element of truth in moral relativism, while opposing the more extreme claims that are plausible. There are, of course, personal elements in moral judgments, and these judgments are not absolute (that is, admitting of no exceptions). With an empirical rational objective standard there is nothing to prevent an action from being right for one person and wrong for another. For example a person who is a strong swimmer and who has taken life saving lessons has a greater duty and obligation to rescue someone who is drowning than another person who is unable to swim. The poor swimmer has no obligation, duty, or value because of their lack of ability to effect a rescue. While it is obvious that the panic stricken swimmer will attempt to surmount the more purposeful and powerful swimmer true duty is far more egalitarian than logical conclusion or definition provides. Biological, physical, psychological, sociological, and cultural conditions influence such decisions. If the conditions of life undergo change and if there is a development in the information age of humanities knowledge of itself and the world there will be changes in the moral and ethical codes.
The suggested approach can be accepted by those who hold variant philosophical positions, since it is not dependent on a single, or potentially subjective, metaphysical approach. It might be held by realists, idealists, pragmatists, transcendentalists and any other 'ists' or adherents to various 'isms'. It is compatible and consistent with a humanistic and naturalistic, as well as with a theistic view of humanity.
